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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATES

Sackett v. EPA,
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)
In Sackett v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that the Sacketts may
challenge the issuance of an administrative compliance order under the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") through a civil action under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.
The Sacketts' own a residential lot north of Priest Lake, separated
by several permanent structures. The Sacketts' received an administrative
compliance order asserting that the Sacketts' property contained navigable
waters, and they had violated the Clean Water Act by depositing fill
material on their property. The Sacketts were ordered to restore their
property in accordance with an EPA created Restoration Work Plan. The
Sacketts asked the EPA for a hearing, but was denied. The Sacketts then
brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho under the APA, contending the
EPA's compliance order was "arbitrary and capricious" and "deprived
them of 'life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' in violation
of the Fifth Amendment." The District Court dismissed the claims due to
subject-matter jurisdiction, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Sacketts brought suit under chapter 7 of the APA, which
provides for judicial review of a "final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Supreme Court
first considered whether the compliance order was a final agency action.
The Court found compliance order was an agency action under the APA.
Furthermore, the compliance order was final because the EPA had
determined legal obligations and legal consequences due to the issuance of
the order. Additionally, once the order had been issued, it was not subject
to any further agency review. The Government claimed the order was
subject to further agency review because the order invited the Sacketts to
engage in informal discussions. However, the Court held an informal
discussion and invited contentions of inaccuracy are not sufficient to make
an agency action not final.
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In addition to a final agency action, judicial review under the APA
also required there to be "no other adequate remedy in court." 5 U.S.C. §
704. Normally, in Clean Water Act enforcement cases, judicial review is
through a civil action under 33 U.S.C. § 1319. However, the Sacketts
could not initiate that process. The only other possible route to judicial
review is by applying to the Corps of Engineers for a permit, and then
filing suit under the APA if the permit is denied. Nevertheless, the
Government does not rely on such, but rather on § 701(a)(1) of the APA,
which excludes APA review to the extent that other statutes preclude
judicial review.
The Government claims the Clean Water Act is such a statute.
There is nothing in the Clean Water Act that expressly precludes judicial
review under the APA. Nonetheless, in determining whether a statute
precludes judicial review, the Court looks to more than the express
language. The Court will examine inferences of intent drawn from the
statutory scheme as a whole.
The Government offered several reasons why the statutory scheme
of the Clean Water Act precludes judicial review. The Government
argued that Congress gave the EPA the choice between a judicial
proceeding or an administrative action under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3), and
it would undermine the Clean Water Act to allow a judicial review of the
administrative action. However, the Court was not convinced because it
would create the premise that the relevant difference between a
compliance order and an enforcement proceeding is that only the latter is
subject to a judicial review. There are other sound reasons why
compliance orders are useful other than to provide insulation from judicial
review. The Government suggested that compliance orders provide a
means of notifying recipients of potential violations, and allow for an
opportunity of voluntary compliance. Allowing judicial review when a
recipient chooses not to comply with the order is consistent with this
function.
The Government also argues that compliance orders are not selfexecuting, but must be enforced by the agency in a judicial action.
Therefore, the compliance order is merely a step in a process, and not a
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sanction subject to judicial review. However, the APA provides for a
judicial review of all final agency actions, and not just those that impose a
self-executing sanction.
Another argument the Government put forth is that Congress
expressly provided for judicial review on the administrative record when
the EPA assesses administrative penalties after a hearing. However,
Congress did not expressly provide for judicial review on compliance
orders. Nevertheless, the express provision ofjudicial review in one
section of a long and complicated statute is not enough to overcome the
APA's presumption of reviewability for all final agency actions.
The Government's final argument was that Congress passed the
Clean Water Act largely to respond to the inefficiency of the then-existing
remedies for water pollution. Compliance orders allow for a quick
remedy, and the EPA is less likely to use compliance orders if they will be
subject to judicial review. The EPA may be less likely to use compliance
orders if they are subject to judicial review; however, that is true for all
agency actions subject to judicial review. The APA's presumption of
judicial review demonstrates that efficiency of regulation is not the most
important consideration. There is also no reason to believe that the Clean
Water Act was specially designed to force people to comply without the
opportunity for judicial review.
In this case, the compliance order was a final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy other than APA review. The
Clean Water Act does not preclude judicial review of the compliance
order. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Justice Ginsburg, concurring
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court, and felt the Agency ruled
definitively, in that the Sacketts may immediately litigate their
jurisdictional challenge in federal court. However, whether the Sacketts
could challenge the EPA's authority to regulate their land under the Clean
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Water Act, and at the pre-enforcement state, when the terms and
conditions of the compliance order has yet to be determined. Only on that
understanding, did Justice Ginsburg join the opinion of the Court.
Justice Alito, concurring
Justice Alito felt the reach of the Clean Water Act is unclear. Any
land that is wet at least part of the year could be classified by the EPA as
wetlands, and thereby fall under the Clean Water Act. If the property
owners begin constructing a house, they could face up to $75,000 in fines
per day for refusal to obey the EPA's compliance order, demanding the
owners cease construction, engage in expensive remedial measures, and
abandon the property. Furthermore, until the EPA sues the property
owners, they are blocked from the courts. This Court's decision does
provide some relief for property owners. Property owners have the right
to challenge the EPA jurisdictional determination under the APA.
However, to provide real relief, Congress should provide a reasonably
clear rule regarding the reach of the Clean Water Act.
MARRIAM LIN
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Department of Environmental Services, City and County of Honolulu v.
Land Use Commission, State of Hawai'i
2012 WL 1571503 (Haw. 2012)
The Department of Environmental Services for the City and
County of Honolulu, Hawai'i ("DES") appealed an order from the Land
Use Commission ("LUC") approving the department's application for a
special use permit to expand the Wailmanalo Gulch Sanitary Landfill
("WGSL"). The DES appealed only the validity of a condition prohibiting
the WGSL from accepting municipal solid waste. The DES argued that
the restriction was not supported by the substantial evidence, and is
invalid.
The WGSL consists of approximately 200 acres in the state
agricultural district on the island of O'ahu. Since 1989, 107.5 acres of the
land have been used as a landfill. The WGSL is both the only O'ahu
landfill permitted to receive municipal solid waste and the only landfill
permitted to accept the ash and residue produced by Honolulu's HPOWER waste-to-energy facility. A need for additional space to
accommodate the volume of these two categories of waste prompted the
DES to apply for a permit for expansion of the landfill in 2008.
Under the zoning requirements of the City of Honolulu, the landfill
needs a revised Special Use Permit ("SUP") to expand the landfill portion
of its land. An SUP must first be approved by the Planning Commission
of the City and County of Honolulu ("Planning Commission"), and then
approved by the LUC, which is empowered to approve, approve with
modification, or deny the permit application. The Planning Commission
approved the permit, allowing the expansion of WGSL until it reaches the
capacity allowed by the State Department of Health. Its acceptance
required that the City find and develop new landfill sites before November
1, 2010 and continue to use alternative waste disposal methods to reduce
Honolulu's dependence on WGSL. The Planning Commission noted that
268
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a minimum of seven years would be necessary to develop a new landfill
site, and so declined to place an expiration date on the SUP
The LUC also accepted the permit application, but added a
condition that the WGSL would stop accepting municipal solid waste after
July 31, 2012. On March 1, 2010, the DES filed a brief with the circuit
court arguing that the closure deadline was arbitrary and capricious, and
an abuse of discretion, because the record before the Planning
Commission established that there will always be waste material that
cannot be disposed of through other methods. They argued that this
requires the option to dispose of municipal solid waste at the WGSL
beyond the proposed July 31, 2012 deadline. Though the circuit court
found that DES was "aggrieved," it affirmed the deadline. On July 14,
2011, DES filed a timely application to have the case transferred to the
Supreme Court of Hawai'i, which was accepted on August 1, 2011.
The court found that, although the LUC has authority to impose
restrictive conditions in permit approvals, the conditions must be
supported by substantial evidence. The evidence presented throughout the
application process indicates both that the timeline required to develop a
new landfill site, and that a landfill is necessary to accommodate proper
solid waste management. This record does not support the LUC's
deadline condition. As such, the court held that the condition was an
abuse of discretion and vacated it.
Further, because the application's approval was conditioned on the
added deadline, the court found that the approval was also invalidated.
Based on case law from other jurisdictions, the court found that a
commission's conditional decision cannot be implemented if a required
condition is vacated, unless the commission could only reach the
conclusion that the permit should have been issued. As such, it must be
remanded to the LUC for further proceedings.

MICHAEL POWELL

269

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATES

North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. North Carolina Department of
Transportation
2012 WL 1548685 (4th Cir. 2012)
The North Carolina Wildlife Federation, Clean Air Carolina, and
Yadkin Riverkeeper (collectively, the "Conservation Groups") filed suit
against the North Carolina Department of Transportation and the Federal
Highway Administration (collectively, the "Agencies"), contending that
the process by which the Agencies approved the construction of a twentymile toll road violated the National Environmental Protection Act
("NEPA"). The district court granted summary judgment to the Agencies,
and the Conservation Groups appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
The North Carolina Department of Transportation has repeatedly
proposed the construction of the Monroe Connector Bypass, but has not
been successful. In 2007, the department, supervised by the Federal
Highway Administration, began the NEPA-mandated environmental
assessment process. The project sought to address capacity deficiencies
on U.S. Highway 74. In addition to the required variety of alternatives,
the Agencies created a "no build" baseline using information from the
Mecklenburg-Union Metropolitan Planning Organization ("MUMPO").
For a variety of reasons, most notably that the projected traffic volume for
the "build" scenario was actually less than the "no build" scenario's traffic
volume, the Agencies were repeatedly queried whether the "no build"
scenario in fact assumed that the Monroe Connector Bypass would be
built.
In response to these queries, the Agencies repeatedly stated that the
MUMPO projections did not assume the construction of the bypass. On
the basis of those statements, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued its
Endangered Species Act concurrence, which allowed the process to
proceed. On August 27, 2010, the Agencies completed the final
component of the NEPA process by issuing their Record of Decision, at
which point the Conservation Groups again asked whether the projections
actually represented a "no build" scenario. The Record of Decision again
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responded with denials, and a site was selected for the Monroe Connector
Bypass at an estimated cost of $800 million.
On November 12, 2010, the Conservation Groups filed suit
seeking to enjoin construction of the bypass, alleging that the Agencies
violated NEPA by "(1) failing to analyze the environmental impacts of the
Monroe Connector[ ]; (2) conducting a flawed analysis of alternatives; and
(3) presenting materially false and misleading information to other
agencies and to the public." In response, the Agencies admitted for the
first time that the MUMPO projections assumed the construction of the
bypass, but asked for and were granted summary judgment, as the district
court ruled that their reliance on the MUMPO projections was reasonable,
and thus did not violate NEPA.
NEPA requires that agencies take a "hard look" at environmental
consequences of their proposed actions and to provide for the
dissemination of environmental information. It does not require particular
substantive results, but only that the agencies engage in a process that
informs them of the environmental implications of their actions.
Specifically, it requires that agencies proposing major action prepare an
environmental impact statement that includes alternatives to the proposed
action and the environmental impact of the proposed action.
There is no dispute that the Monroe Connector Bypass represents a
major action under NEPA, and the Agencies concede much of the
Conservation Groups' arguments, essentially only arguing that, despite the
flawed analysis, they conducted a "thorough analysis of the environmental
impacts," and that the court should defer to their expertise. However, as
the purpose of the environmental impact statement is to provide a basis for
public comment on the action, the court held that Agencies' actions do not
fulfill the requirements of NEPA, as the public comment relied on the
Agencies' repeated, incorrect claim that the "no build" scenario did not
assume the construction of the bypass. Thus, because of the Agencies'
failure to uphold the procedural requirements of NEPA, the court vacated
the judgment of the district court and remanded the project for further
proceedings.
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Missouri Coalition for the Environment Foundation v. Jackson
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19723
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") makes states initially responsible
for assigning uses to the state's waters and setting standards consistent
with the water's assigned use. The CWA requires states to review their
water standards every three years. In the course of the review, the state
determines whether a body of water may be used for fishing or swimming.
If a body of water is unfit for those uses, the state must include a scientific
study showing that use cannot be achieved. This review is then sent to the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The EPA then can approve
or disapprove of the state's new standards. The EPA also has authority
under a discretionary clause to promulgate standards for the state
regardless of what standards were submitted to the EPA.
Missouri lists some of its lakes and streams on its water quality
lists. Those appearing on the list are known as "classified waters," those
bodies of water not appearing on the state's lists are known as
"unclassified waters." Only classified waters were subjected to Missouri's
CWA review and were assigned uses. In 2000, the EPA sent a letter to the
director of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, in which the
EPA expressed its view that unclassified waters should also be subjected
to review.
During its 2005 review, Missouri assigned uses to some but not all
of its waters. This review was submitted to the EPA. The EPA concluded
its review of Missouri's water standards in 2007 without addressing
Missouri's failure to assign uses to some waters.
The Missouri Coalition for the Environment Foundation filed suit
against the EPA. The coalition alleged that the EPA's decision to ignore
the fact that Missouri's review was incomplete was arbitrary and
capricious. The coalition claimed that the EPA's decision not to bring
Missouri into compliance was arbitrary and capricious.
The District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that
the CWA required states to include all the state's waters in its review and
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Missouri's decision to include only some of the state's waters was a
violation of the CWA.
The court held that, because the CWA limited the EPA's approval
or disapproval to new standards set by the state, the EPA did not act
arbitrarily when it did not approve or disapprove of Missouri's limited
review. The court also reasoned that because the letter to the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources did not condition approval of Missouri's
review on the inclusion of all the state's waters, there was no past policy
requiring the inclusion of all of Missouri's waters in the review.
Therefore there was no arbitrary or capricious deviation from the EPA's
past policy.
The court held that the EPA's decision not to promulgate default
uses for Missouri's unclassified waters was not subject to judicial review.
Judicial review is unavailable where the issue is committed to agency
discretion and there is no law to apply. The court held that the CWA did
not provide any standard as to when the EPA should exercise its
discretion. The EPA's own regulations repeat the CWA and, the court
held, do not provide guidance for the use of the EPA's discretion.
Because there was no law to apply here, the EPA's discretion was outside
judicial review.

AARON ROWLEY
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Friends of Back Bay v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
681 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2012).

Following a notice and comment period, the Corps of Engineer's
("the Corps) issued a permit allowing construction of additional boat slips
in a cove connected by tributary to an area of Virginia Beach known as
Back Bay ("the Bay"). The permit approved dredging, excavation, and
relocation of silt materials within the Bay as well as construction of
various structures. The purpose of the construction project ("the Project")
was to house additional watercraft owned by residents living in near by
properties, which would be used recreationally in the Bay's waters. The
permit specified that any vegetated wetland area cleared during
construction required the creation of an equal amount of vegetated wetland
in a nearby area and required any plant life displaced by the Project be
relocated into that mitigation area. Finally, the permit contained optional
conditions such as the creation of a no-wake zone indicated by the posting
of signs.
When it issued the permit, the Corps did so despite having received
over 350 comments from the public almost all of which were opposed to
the permit. In those comments were statements from various state and
federal agencies including the EPA and NFS. These entities felt the
project would cause irreversible ecological and environmental damage to
the Bay and its ecosystem and they universally recommended that the
permit either be denied or substantially modified. Specifically, there was
concern that increased traffic from motorized watercraft would disturb and
destroy the marshland ecosystem in the Bay. The NSF stated that it would
withdraw is opposition provided that the permit require adequate funding
for the enforcement of a no-wake zone ("NWZ") in the Bay which would
mitigate the increased boat traffic by preventing the production of
destructive wakes in the bay area. In the alternative, the NFS
recommended that the Corps issue an Environmental Impact Statement
regarding the Project's effect on the Bay.
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In June 2006, following consideration of these comments, the
Corps issued a Local Order imposing a NWZ in the Bay area. Then, in
October of 2008, the Corps issued its Environmental Assessment required
under the National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA") in which the
Corps made a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI") vis-A-vis the
Project thereby rendering an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS")
unnecessary. That same day the Corps granted the permit. While
recognizing the environmental importance of a NWZ, the permit did not
mandate the creation or enforcement of a NWZ instead making the NWZ
an optional condition, nor did the permit mandate adequate funding for the
enforcement of the NWZ. This was problematic because local and
national environmental enforcement agencies were understaffed and
underfunded and therefore unable adequately enforce the NWZ inside the
Bay. Thus, a group called Friends of Back Bay ("Plaintiffs") filed suit in
United States District Court seeking review of the Corps's action under
the NEPA alleging that the Corps's FONSI was arbitrary and capricious
and alleging that the Corps violated the Clean Water Act by issuing the
permit. After considering the parties' briefs, the district court issued an
order and opinion in favor of the Corps finding that the Corps acted within
its broad agency discretion when making its FONSI and granting the
permit without first preparing an EIS was therefore not contrary to law.
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit revealed the case de novo indicating
that while review of agency action is highly deferential it is not "a rubber
stamp" of approval. The court then explained that reversal was
appropriate only if the agency's action could be deemed arbitrary and
capricious. The Plaintiffs argued that the Corps' FONSI was based on the
environmental mitigation provided by the creation of a NWZ, but pointed
out that the permit failed to mandate the creation of a NWZ and failed to
require adequate funding for the enforcement of a NWZ thus making the
decision arbitrary and capricious. Conversely, the Corps argued that the
FONSI was based on a consideration of the environment during the twoyear period in which the NWZ had been in effect pursuant to the Local
Order. Thus, according to the Corps, the FONSI was based on a
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consideration of the efficacy of the NWZ in addressing the
aforementioned environmental concerns.
The court noted prior decisions holding arbitrary and capricious
various actions taken by agencies on the basis of inaccurate baseline
assumptions regarding the existence of some underlying condition. In this
case, the court pointed out that the Corps' FONSI was based on the
assumed existence and enforcement of a NWZ pursuant to its Local Order.
The court opined that this constituted a material misapprehension of the
reality of the situation because absent additional funding there would be
no efficacious enforcement of the NWZ and thus no prevention of the
previously discussed environmental harms. Moreover, the court noted the
absence of funding had left the NWZ unmarked. Thus, the public

remained unaware that the NWZ existed meaning that even persons who
would have voluntarily complied with the NWZ could not do so.
Ultimately, the court reversed and remanded holding that the FONSI was
arbitrary and capricious since it was premised on the Corps' incorrect
assumption that an effective NWZ existed when in fact, the NWZ had
inadequate funding for effective enforcement and therefore would not
provide the presumed environmental protections which had led to the
FONSI. Having reversed and remanded on the NEPA issue, the court
declined to address Plaintiffs' contentions under the Clean Water Act.
However, noting that the policy goals underlying the NEPA are best
served if regulatory agencies err in favor of preparing an ESI whenever
there is a substantial possibility that a proposed project may have a
significant environmental impact, the court recommend that on remand the
Corps conduct an ESI.

RYAN NIEHAUS
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